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1. Introduction  
 The present chapter starts to be written at the day Dilma Rousseff - recently 
reelected Brazilian President - addresses the country stating that one current 
corruption investigation “might, indeed, change the country forever”.
1
 She refers to an 
investigation conducted by the Brazilian Federal Police regarding the public state oil 
company Petrobrás, one of the biggest in the world. Several arrests were made during 
2014, but the historical moment highlighted by the President stems from the arrest of 
23 people, among them high-ranking officials of the eight major building companies 
of the country, including some CEOs. The so-called “Lava Jato Task Force” 
investigates millionaire briberies paid by building companies in order to secure 
contracts with Petrobrás. The case became popular during the 2014 Presidential 
Elections, when privileged information from the statement of a key witness benefit 
from “delação premiada” were leaked to the press. Those briberies were supposedly 
transferred, after laundered, to finance political parties that support Dilma Roussef’s 
government: PP, PMDB and PT. Some of Brazil’s biggest media organizations 
reported - two days before final election round - that Dilma and Lula knew about 
Petrobrás corruption scheme for almost 10 years - even though no evidence was 
presented
2
. Dilma had to use her last campaign program to defend herself from what 
she called “electoral terrorism” with “criminal intent” from “Veja and its 
accomplices”, that stamped the fact in its magazine cover.
3
  
 Major corruption scandals are part of Brazilian political life for many decades. 
During the twelve years of Lula (2003-2010) and Dilma (2011-…) federal 
administration, investigations and prosecutions for corruption were closely followed – 
and frequently overstated - by the media. Before “Lava Jato”, the so-called 
“Mensalão Case” regarding the briberies to members of the parliament led to 
conviction and prison sentences imposed by the Supreme Court to prominent figures 
of Lula’s administration and his political party, PT
4
.  
                                                        
1
 “Eu acho que isso pode, de fato, mudar o país para sempre” quoted at “Investigação sobre Petrobrás 
deverá mudra o País ‘para sempre’, diz Dilma. O Estado de São Paulo, 16.11.2014.  
2
 The cover of Veja Magazine, from October 29 2014, had pictures of both Lula and Dilma and the title 
“They knew about everything”.  
3
 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YEk6f9RpnOM#t=80.  
4
 Called by the major media, “the judgment of the century”, Mensalão Case shed light to a bribery 
scheme involving advertising agencies and financial institutions that were allegedly in place – with the 
same actors – during the political campaign for reelection of Eduardo Azeredo to the government of 
Minas Gerais. Eduardo Azeredo used to be the president of PSDB, the major political party at the 
opposition. This case however was not prosecuted by the Federal Supreme Court, as the Mensalão 
 5 
 The country is therefore divided between the ones, like the former President 
Cardoso (from PSDB, the political party that leads the opposition to the current 
government) that considers “shameful” the current scandals;
5
 and others, like 
President Dilma that see the rising number of corruption investigations as a great 




 Indeed, since redemocratization and the enactment of the new federal 
constitution in 1988, several legal and institutional reforms have provoked substantial 
changes in administrative control mechanisms (auditing, corregedorias and 
parliamentary investigations) and judicial interventions (criminal procedures, civil 
procedures for “improbity” and electoral procedures). New bodies were created 
within the Executive to allow national and international exchange of information and 
evidences, while old institutions were redesigned to strengthen their independency 
and hold new functions. And, above all, Brazilian civil society and international 
organizations, as OECD and UN, elevated corruption to a major social problem and 
heavily pressured the agencies for a due enforcement of administrative, civil and 
criminal legislation. Brazilian anti-corruption law was not developed and 
implemented at once; much on the contrary, it is the result of reforms that took place 
in different social and political contexts – and, of course, continues to be targeted by 
many social forces still today
7
.   
 In this scenario, the idea of “institutional multiplicity” describes the existence 
and the functioning of dozens of actors from the executive, legislative and judiciary. 
Based on different legislations, monitoring, investigation, prosecution and 
enforcement of sanctions are conducted with a great deal of independency. The way 
in which Brazilian anti-corruption law is currently organized makes impossible or 
extremely difficult to one identify how similar corruption schemes will or can be 
handled by the different set of institutions that intervene in criminal, civil and 
administrative proceedings. Case studies and in-depth interviews have shown that 
                                                                                                                                                              
Case, and still waits for a decision at the State level courts in Minas Gerais. (“Recurso adia sentence de 
Azeredo no mensalão mineiro”, O Estado de São Paulo, October 28, 2014.) For an overview of both 








 As of December 18 2014, there are 788 draft laws in the national congress with the subject 
“corruption” (570 at the Deputies House and 218 at the Senate) Also, Dilma Roussef has made the 
“strengthening of the anti-corruption” one of the main topics of her reelection campaign. See 
http://www.dilma.com.br/ (as of December 18 2014).  
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institutional multiplicity can lead to inconsistent decisions and foster re-work; on the 
other hand, it also highlights that multiplicity can contribute to overcome agencies 
capture problems (See Introductory Chapter). That is the research topic this chapter 
focuses on, summarized in the following question: how do institutions interact when 
handling corruption cases?  
 The present chapter is divided in five parts, including this introduction. The 
next section will give an historical introduction to current Brazil’s anti-corruption 
institutions, highlighting its creation as an incremental process developed over several 
decades. The third section will describe Brazil’s anti-corruption system using a 
procedural scheme that categorize enforcement in four different categories - 
monitoring, investigation, adjudication and sanction-enforcement  - and add a fifth 
procedure that helps to support the other four: orientation or provision of information. 
The fourth section describes different relationships between those institutions and 
focus on different coordination mechanisms among them, dividing them between 
inter- and intra-institutional and inter and intra-procedural mechanisms. Finally, the 
last section gives an overall summary and highlights some of the coordination 
obstacles that found during our empirical research. 
 This case-study rely on data obtained through the review of institutional 
annual reports and those made for international institutions evaluations; analysis of 
current anti-corruption legislation; 23 in-depth semi-directive interviews with high 
and medium-level governmental employees – among them Directors, Councilors, 






2. Historical Approach 
 Since colonial times, dismissal and fines can be imposed to public authorities 
that received gifts in certain circumstances
8
. After the independence from Portugal, all 
Brazilian Constitutions - 1824, 1891, 1934, 1946, 1967 and the one in force at the 
moment, 1988 – explicitly mentioned public authorities and employees could be held 
accountable for different forms of misuse of public funds
9
. Also, since the first 
criminal code, in 1830, job dismissal, fine and incarceration are established for the 
“crimes against the good order and the public administration”.
10
 Similar provisions 
appeared in the following criminal codes (the 1890 and the 1940, currently in force). 
At the civil sphere, on the other hand, the first provision appeared at second 
half of the XX century. Legislation from 1957 created civil mechanisms that allowed 
seizure and loss of assets in favor of the State (“sequestro e perda em favor da 
Fazenda Pública”) for abuse of public function, independently of the criminal 
responsibility (Law 3164/57). In the following year, a new legislation regulated 
“illicit enrichment” and opted for civil actions to pursue both assets recovery and 
damages reparation; the damaged public institution, public prosecutors and citizens 
under certain circumstances were eligible to start those actions (Law 3502/58). Both 
laws, however, were rarely applied (Marques, 2010, p. 33).  
The scenario started to change with the 1988 Federal Constitution, which 
established a broad and complex control system of public administration. As 
suggested by Marques (2010, p. 37-38), articles from different sections of the 
Constitution might be organized in three axis: (i) internal control exercised by 
administrative bodies themselves (Procuradorias, Corregedorias and Ouvidorias); 
(ii) external control exercised by the accounting tribunals (at the federal, provincial 
and some time municipal levels), designed as auxiliaries bodies of the Legislative 
branch; and (iii) external control exercised by the Judicial branch, together with 
Ministerio Público, through criminal and civil proceedings. 
It was also in the late 80’s that the Federal Constitution attributed to public 
prosecutors the institutional power to promote “public civil action”, a legal action 
                                                        
8
 See Ordenações Filipinas, section LXXI, the Portuguese Legislation in force in Brazil during the 
colonial period (XVI century until the beginning of XIX century).  
9
 For a detailed explanation of them, see Marques (2010, p. 28-31). All legislation mentioned in this 
chapter can be found at http://www2.camara.leg.br/  
10
 Brazilian Criminal Code, 1830, “crimes contra a boa ordem e administração pública”, articles 129 to 
166.  
 8 
created in 1985 to advance the protection of public interests as the environment, the 
artistic, historical and touristic heritage, as well as the economic order and the public 
property (Law 7347/85).  
 
2.1. The 1990’s 
 Four years after the enactment of the Federal Constitution, Fernando Collor de 
Melo – Brazil’s first directly elected President after military dictatorship, who lost his 
position through impeachment due to his involvement in corruption - promulgated the 
Improbity Law (Law 8429/92). This new legislation defined “acts of administrative 
improbity” and established non-criminal sanctions, strengthening the mechanism of 
the “public civil action” created before the federal constitution (Law 7347/85). The 
Improbity Law marks not only “the conclusion of the (…) process of independency” 
of the Ministério Público (Arantes, 2002, p. 76), but also became the “cornerstone of 
the judicialization of the politics in Brazil, as it expanded the [possibilities] of actions 
against public officials”, without jurisdiction privileges (foro privilegiado) granted at 
the criminal sphere (Arantes, 2002, p. 152-3). The law also tried to make the most of 
the great number of existing public prosecutors available to investigate, persecute and 
impose civil sanctions to public officials from the three branches of the government 
(Arantes, 2002).  
 Besides the strengthening of Ministério Publico, the nineties were marked by 
the creation of new institutions and substantial redesign of already existing ones. In 
1993, the AGU (Advocacia Geral da União) was created to represent the Federal 
administration in all judicial and extrajudicial proceedings (Constitution, art. 131). 
Linked to the Presidency and with a very well remunerated career, AGU has units in 
all states of Brazil. As next section shows, AGU has recently developed working 
groups focusing specifically in public property with substancial impact at anti-
corruption law enforcement.  
By the end of the 90’s, the Public Ethics Comission (Comissão de Ética 
Pública) was created to investigate the violation of ethical norms by high-ranking 
officials
11
. This Commission – also linked to the Presidency – also acts as a 
consultancy body: authorities might report ethical doubts or make ethical consults 
before making decisions involving public expenditures or accepting gifts or 
                                                        
11
 For further information see CEP webpage: http://etica.planalto.gov.br/ (as of December 18, 2014).   
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invitations from third parties. CEP was meant to be the central node of the new 
Ethical system, formed by ethical commissions spread out in all different institutions 
of federal public administration. Ethical Commissions were also created at the 




At the Legislative branch, it is worth mentioning the shift that TCU’s 
(Tribunal de Contas da União) role in government auditing has been through. Created 
in the first Republican Brazilian constitution, in 1891, TCU was set as an institution 
that supports Congress in its role of controlling the government (external control). 
Although somehow linked to the Legislative, the 1988 Constitution “specifies in 
detail the powers and responsibilities of TCU, thus guaranteeing the agency 
considerable autonomy from Congress as well” (Speck, 2011, p. 135).  The current 
institutional design of TC is defined in the 1988 Constitution and in its 1992 Organic 
Law (Law 8443/1992)
13
. As Speck (2011, p. 136) points out, unlike many other 
countries, TCU and state auditing institutions in Brazil “are empowered to directly 
punish misconduct through imposition of fines and bans on public contracting”. And, 
in many cases, as section 4 below shows, TCU reports misconduct to other 
institutions, also competent to impose sanctions.  
Also in the Legislative, during the 90’s, the number of Parliamentary 
Investigative Commissions (CPI) raised substantially at federal, state and municipal 
levels. According to Pedone at alli (2001, p. 201), the main feature of this form of 
control is its “political dimension” marked by “negotiations, coalizations [and] search 
for consensus and differentiation”.   The study of major CPI cases during the nineties 
led authors to conclude “these commissions play a fundamental role at the dynamics 
of the democratic process, as they are able to investigate and elucidate doubtful facts 
within the public administration” (Pedone ate alli, 2001, p. 222). Later and less 
optimistic analysis, however, points out CPIs “are simply too politicized” and “not 
especially effective”, as “the vast majority” of CPIs are closed without a final report 
(Power and Taylor 2011, p. 253).  
                                                        
12
 For the Ethical Commission created in 1993 at the Senate, see 
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/conselho/conselho.asp?con=445 (as of December 18, 2014). For 
the one created in 2001 at the House of Deputies, see http://www2.camara.leg.br/a-
camara/eticaedecoro (as of December 18, 2014).  
13
 For an overview of new tasks and legislative changes regarding TCU, see Speck, 2011, p. 159 
(footnote 15).  
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2.2. The 2000’s 
From early 2000’s on, two sorts of institutional development in the anti-
corruption domain can be observed. On one hand, legal reforms led to creation of 
centralized regulatory bodies within the public administration, the Judiciary and the 
Ministério Público, in order to strengthen the mechanisms of internal control (CGU, 
CNJ and CNMP). On the other hand, the internationalization of corruption and money 
laundering control, as well as challenges brought by enforcement institutions during 
the previous decade, led to the creation of a new set of bodies devoted to institutional 
coordination (ENCCLA and DRCI).  
The Federal Comptroller’s Office (CGU – Controladoria Geral da União) is 
the pivot body of anti-corruption at the federal administration. Created in 2001 and 
restructured in 2006, CGU is also directly linked to the Presidency and is currently in 
charge of internal control, disciplinary proceedings and advancing programs of 
transparency and prevention of corruption.
 14
 It has become a role model and has 
inspired Comptroller Office in state and city level throughout the country (Interview 
01).  
The constitutional reform of 2004 successfully created the National Council of 
Justice (CNJ – Conselho Nacional de Justiça) and the National Council of Ministério 
Público (CNMP – Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público), which centralizes 
financial and administrative control of the Judiciary and Ministério Público, 
respectively
15
.  Besides pursuing internal control, CNJ sets national public policies, 
goals and recommendations for those institutions, covering among its different areas 
incarceration, environment, human rights and also, corruption and improbity. At the 
end of 2012, CNJ  launched  the “Goal 18”, a set of measures aiming to identify all 
proceedings related to corruption and improbity at all federal and state appellate 
courts (TJs – Tribunais de Justiça), Superior Court of Justice and Supreme Federal 
Court. According to CNJ, that data gathering aims, among other things, “to answer 
the questions of FATF/OECD who evaluated negatively Brazilian efforts to handle 
                                                        
14
 For CGU functions and competences, see Law 10.683/03, article 17 and www.cgu.gov.br (as of 
December 18, 2014).  
15
 Both created by the Constitutional Amendment 45/2004. For further information see 
http://www.cnmp.mp.br/portal/ and http://www.cnj.jus.br/ (as of December 18, 2014). 
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these crimes in view of the lack of statistics”
 16 . 
Section 3.5 will present an overview 
of this data.  
It was also during the 2000’s that ENCCLA was created. Although not 
formalized by a Law, ENCCLA is one of the most important debate forums for anti-
corruption in Brazil. ENCCLA stands for Estratégia Nacional de Combate à 
Corrupção e Lavagam de Ativos and consist of an articulation among different 
institutions in the federal level - from the Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, among 
others – and civil society that act, directly or indirectly, in anti-corruption and anti-
money-laundering. It has among its goals the “analysis of scenarios, the identification 
of threats, the definition of efficient and effective policies and the development of a 
prevention and money laundering fight culture and its correlation with corruptions 
crime” (MESICIC, 4
th
 round, p. 8). Currently, more than 60 governmental and non-
governmental institutions and private entities as banks send representatives to 
ENCCLA’s annual meeting – usually held in December – in which debates are held 
between thematic work groups and goals and programs to be created and developed in 
the next year are decided.
17
 Note that ENCCLA operates less in enforcement activities 
of anti-corruption strategies and more in its creation and adaptation. As recognized by 
several high officials, ENCCLA has been also extremely important in creating a 
communication channel between those different federal anti-corruption institutions 
and in making employees from these different institutions trust each other.
18
  
At the judicial domain, exchange of information and evidence with foreign 
institutions substantially increased during the nineties. International cooperation in 
criminal matters was completely restructured with the Constitutional Amendment 
45/2004. In that context, DRCI (Departamento de Recuperação de Ativos e 
Cooperação Jurídica Internacional) was created within the Ministry of Justice, with 
the main task of dealing with all sorts of international cooperation and asset recovery 
procedures. The body also plays a central role in the formulation and discussion of 
                                                        
16
 News prepared by CNJ itself also mentions the Brazilian evaluation in the UNCAC implementation 
process. Vasconcelos, Jorge. “Justiça condena 205 por corrupção, lavagem e improbidade em 2012”. 
Agência CNJ, 15/04/2013. Available at http://www.cnj.jus.br/noticias/cnj/24270-justica-condena-205-
por-corrupcao-lavagem-e-improbidade-em-2012. (as of 15.oct.2014).  
17
 For further information, see Machado (2012) and ENCCLA’s page at the Minister of Justice website: 
http://portal.mj.gov.br/data/Pages/MJ7AE041E8ITEMID3239224CC51F4A299E5174AC98153FD1PT
BRNN.htm (As of December 18, 2014). 
18
 Interview 05 and Interview 11.  
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bilateral and multilateral agreements, as well as in the internal coordination of anti-
corruption authorities through ENCCLA.  
In 2008, AGU created the “permanent group of proactive action”, a group of 
public lawyers with the task of intervening on behalf of Brazilian State in proceedings 
related to public property and corruption – specifically improbity, public civil law 
actions and enforcement of TCU decisions. In 2011, the group received the Innovare 
Prize for its outstanding performance in filing actions and recovering assets. 
Answering the question of the main innovation of their practice, the group highlights 




During the 2000’s, different NGOs gained more relevance countrywide, mainly 
monitoring government activities, making anti-corruption denounces and, sometimes, 
organizing legislative changes.  Some NGOs also produce publications, studies, 
manifests or/and texts that seek to empower citizens and other civil society groups in 
anti-corruption, while fostering a culture of probity, accountability and societal 
oversight over the government. While most organizations have a local range of action, 
other acts nationally, like Transparência Brasil, Contas Abertas and Observatário 
Social do Brasil
20
. Some local NGOs are part of networks of similar institutions that 
unite their efforts and exchange information to better perform their jobs. One of the 
most famous networks is the one from “Amarribo”, a local NGO that gained national 





 This network deals more specifically with electoral corruption, a topic 
that several NGOs fight against. 
2.3. The first years of 2010’s 
During the last years, Federal administration has fomented social control with 
the implementation of transparency measures, like Portal da Transparência, Lei de 
                                                        
19
 Innovare Prize is granted annually for innovative practices within the Brazilian Judicial System. The 
board of selection is composed by Rede Globo and representatives of Judiciary, Public Prosecutors and 
Lawyers. For further information about the Prize and AGU proactive group, see 
http://www.premioinnovare.com.br/praticas/grupo-permanente-de-atuacao-pro-ativa-da-agu/ (as of 
December 18, 2014). For the contribution of proactive group to recover assets at the TRT Case, see 
Machado and Ferreira 2014.  
20
 For further information, check their website respectively at www.transparencia.org.br, 
www.contasabertas.com.br and www.observatoriosocialdobrasil.org.br (as of December 18, 2014). 
21
 For further information, check their website at www.amarribo.org.br (as of December 18, 2014).  
22
 This network Amarribo Brasil IFC is composed by 200 organizations present in almost 200 cities. 
For a full list, check http://www.amarribo.org.br/pt_BR/parceiros/rede (as of December 18, 2014).     
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Acesso à Information initiatives, among others. The Lei de Acesso à Informação was 
an essential step in fostering governmental transparency for citizens and even for 
public employees, that many times struggle to obtain data from his or another’s 
organization. This legislation allows any citizen to request information to public 
authorities who are obliged to deliver in 30 days when the information is not 
considered to damage personal rights (art. 11, Law 12.527/11).  
In the massive June 2013 protests that were spread all across Brazil, 
corruption was a special hot topic. Although protests emerged and grew because of 
other reasons, it soon became an opportunity to citizens manifest their great 
disappointment with the current political status quo and the “high level” of 
corruption.
23
 One of the main topics during the protest was a Draft Constitutional 
Amendment (PEC 37) that aimed to remove investigative powers from Ministério 
Público and grant them exclusively to the Police.
24
 Even though interference in 
investigative capacities of public prosecutors would have impact in all criminal 
investigations, the debate was frequently around corruption cases. Media and civil 
society against PEC 37 have named it “PEC of Impunity”, a direct reference to their 
belief that corruption cases would not be investigated without the participation of the 
public prosecutors and would, therefore, assure impunity. 
25
 
In 2012, CGU also promoted a national citizen - participative conference on 
anti-corruption and internal control, the CONSOCIAL (Conferência Nacional sobre 
Transparência e Controle Social). The even intended to invite civil society to express 
its opinions and formulate directives for the elaboration of policies and it was 
prepared for over 18 months, with local and regional preparatory rounds, in which 
social control themes were discussed and an 80 final proposals report elaborated
26
.  
Social movements were also crucial to the approval of Ficha Limpa Law – 
Clean Sheet Law (135/2010) – which forbids anyone convicted for corruption or 
improbity acts (among others) by a bench of judges (court of appeal or higher courts) 
                                                        
23
 Although the June 2013 protests in São Paulo did not start with anti-corruption claims, corruption 
was one of the themes that could be easily found among protesters all over Brazil.  
24
 According to MPF, if approved PEC 37 would kill 12.000 ongoing MPF investigations (that in 2009 
– 2013 have opened more than 300.000 investigations). For more info, check 
http://noticias.pgr.mpf.mp.br/noticias/noticias-do-site/copy_of_geral/pec-37-eliminaria-mais-de-12-
mil-investigacoes-do-mpf-em-andamento (as of December 18, 2014). 
25
 Since 2008, the controversy is subject of constitutional control at the Supreme Federal Court (RE 
593727). As of December 2014, there was no decision. Available at: 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=2641697.  
26
 For more information, please check the official’s reports at CGU website: 
http://www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/controle-social/consocial. (as of December 18, 2014). 
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to be elected for up to 8 years. The constitutionality of the law was questioned in the 
Federal Supreme Court in view of the principle of presumption of innocence but was 
upheld by the majority. In 2014 elections, for instance, Federal Prosecutors obtained 
the suspension of over 4.000 candidates; 497 requests were based on Ficha Limpa 
Law
27
.   
Finally, in 2013, after years in discussion at Government and Parliament, the so-
called Anti-Corruption Law was finally promulgated. The law establishes, among 
other things, civil and administrative liability of legal persons for corruption and 
several other law enforcement innovations. Among them, we highlight lenience 
agreements and corporate liability with fines of up to 20% of its annual income.  
3. Institutions and procedures 
Our analysis breaks down institutions in what we called institutional units, as 
we are not only interested on institutional design but also on the lower level of 
proceedings and decision-making processes. Literature on corruption focusing on 
institutional design are interested in capturing the “big picture” and therefore 
frequently overlooks the phenomenon of “internal fragmentation” in key anti-
corruption institutions. As our research makes the most to take into account a more 
procedural level of analysis, big categories of institutions – “the” judiciary, “the” 
public prosecutor, “the” police - become clearly insufficient to depict institutional 
interaction and coordination experiences and can even make the reader confused 
about how the system actually works. After all, one institution can perform multiple 
activities in different moments of a corruption case; however, most times, there will 
be a specific sub-unit inside it that institution that will only perform one activity (like 
only monitoring, or only investigation, or only prosecution) for one given area (crime, 
civil, administrative, ethics, etc).  
Following the analytical structure proposed at the introduction, this chapter 
describes Brazilian anti-corruption enforcement institutions and its proceedings in 
five main areas: corruption (criminal law), improbity (civil law), auditing, public 
                                                        
27
 “MPF impugna mais de 4 mil candidatos, sendo 497 pela Lei da Ficha Limpa.” MPF. 19 de Agosto 
de 2014. http://noticias.pgr.mpf.mp.br/noticias/noticias-do-site/copy_of_eleitoral/eleicoes-2014-mpf-
impugna-mais-de-4-mil-candidatos-sendo-500-pela-lei-da-ficha-limpa (As of October 16 2014). 
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employment and ethics (all three administrative law)
28
. Using divisions of the areas in 
the horizontal axis, different phases of procedures in the vertical one and breaking 
down the institutions to sub-units, we came up with the representation of Brazilian 
anti-corruption system that can be seen in figure 1.  
 
Although the figure is a very simplistic representation of a complex reality, it 
help us produce very precise descriptions of anti-corruption bodies as it (i) cleans up 
secondary bodies or programs not directly related to these five phases of the 
enforcement process; (ii) allows us to observe different tasks that are fulfilled by the 
same institution although not by the same sector or people; and (iii) sheds light in two 
phases that are usually left behind in legal analysis, but have an important role for the 
system to achieve its goals.  
The framework is also meant to provide a tool to explore our main topic: inter-
institutional coordination. When read horizontally, the table allow us to notice where 
duplication of efforts (two or more institutions playing similar roles) or its absence 
(no institution at all is committed to a certain task) might be; when read vertically, the 
framework helps us see that cases have to pass through several institutions from the 
moment it is uncover to the moment it is closed. When taken as a whole, the 
framework help us better understand how anti-corruption cases flow and to better 
identify coordination of efforts between and inside institutions (when two or more 
units play together  - or according to a very specific division of labor - a certain task). 
The framework also helps to visualize institutional multiplicity and how modular 
arrangements - in which dozens of different combinations are possible and a wide 
range of unknown factors will lead the case to take one or multiple paths - are 
possible. 
Next sections will give a brief description of the system using a horizontal 
reading of the framework. In each phase, the text will highlight some of institutions, 
units and procedures that we have identified as most relevant to the research – that is, 
to explore and understand inter-institutional coordination.  
                                                        
28
 This chapter does not cover electoral law and proceedings. For a complete assessment of the topic 
see Rennó, Lucio. Corruption and Voting. In Corruption and Democracy in Brazil. Power and Taylor 
(ed.). Notre Dame: UND Press, 2011. 
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3.1. Monitoring 
We consider as monitoring those procedures that do not have a specific target, 
but are carried out in apparently regular scenarios to uncover irregularities what will 
then be further investigated. The main goal is to identify “points outside the normal 
curve”, collect preliminary data, elaborate reports and send them to institutional units 
that might have an interest on that data or report. Monitoring procedures can assume 
different forms - like audits,
 29
 inspections or follow-ups – and are carried out by 
different institutions as non-exclusive tasks: CGU, TCU, COAF, DRCI, CNJ and 
CNMP. Out of those, only COAF has monitoring as one of its main attributions. Non-
governmental institutions like NGOs, media and citizens also play an important role 
and are important sources for subsequent investigative procedures (the next phase).  
The strengthening of monitoring procedures represents a major step in the 
shift from a more reactive anti-corruption system to a more proactive one, in which 
one tries to curb corruption practices as early as possible, minimizing damages and 
public funds diversion (Interview 18). As one interviewee puts “[the] intention is to 
make a concomitant control, especially because it avoids financial losses to the state” 
and “[…] recovery success is often very low” (Interview 06).  
Monitoring usually has as its target transactions, expenses, contracts, 
procedures and other acts carried out by public employees from institutions that 
receive public funds. Historically, anti-corruption monitoring was mainly pursued by 
TCU that was responsible to receive and appreciate annual reports of public 
institutions. However, at that time, monitoring was not an independent task, but 
something carried out almost concomitantly with adjudication (approving or 
disapproving institutions annual report, with the establishment of due sanctions when 
irregularities were found).  
It was especially with the introduction of the internal control system (art. 74, 
CF/88) and with significant investments in Information Technology - with the 
creation of powerful data analysis’ software and system - that monitoring procedures 
started to grow in size, intensity and importance. Although the internal control system 
was already referenced in 1988’s Constitution, it only became fully regulated and 
operational in the 2000’s, with the consolidation of CGU, CNJ and CNMP. These 
institutions became central nodes of internal control in the Public Administration and 
                                                        
29
 The term “audit”, at least in Portuguese, might indicate monitoring or investigative proceeding. 
When using the term this report will specify to each function the “auditing activity” corresponds. 
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Judiciary and started to gather performance data on those institutions activities. In 
CGU’s Observatório da Despesa Pública, COAF’s Communication System or CNJ 
and DRCI’s LAB-LD-FT massive data analysis are carried out by computers and 
potential irregularities are shown for human operators that do further analysis, 
elaborate reports and send to the responsible institution. Usually, when a monitoring 
report contains evidence of the practice of crime or improbity, it is sent to the Police 
and/or Ministério Público; when contains a disciplinary fault by a public employee to 
CGU and the employees’ institution internal affairs; some reports even automatically 
are sent to other institutions, regardless of their results (Interview 01).
 
Most are 
forwarded to the head of the other institution and each institution will have their own 
procedure on how that information will be processed and delivered within his 
institution. 
There are also monitoring procedures that do not occur in constant basis, but 
are made periodically (every year) or occasionally. CGU’s Municipalities 
Fiscalization Program draws around 1.000 cities every year for a closer assessment of 
how federal funds were spent; reports are not only published online, but are sent 
automatically to MP and TCU, among others.
30
 
 Anti-corruption institutions - influenced by new public management and an 
increasing pressure from international organizations - also started to monitor its own 
internal procedures and to improve its data collection on the status of 
recommendations and sanctions imposed by them on others. For example, CGU, TCU 
and CNJ make recommendations to its units and try to monitor to see if those 
recommendations were implemented or not.
 
In CNJ, a system called CUMPRIDEC 
has been implemented with this purpose; TCU’s unit SEGECEX also has a system 
similar to that, as well as CGU (Interview 01, 04, 06 and 09). Some units also try to 
monitor if sanctions imposed were executed and how much diverted public was 
finally recovered; Ministério Público in Brazilian TCU is the institution responsible 
for that (Interview 06). CGU also has a system – CGUPAD – where federal 
disciplinary proceedings are inserted and is often used for monitoring and 
coordination purposes.  
                                                        
30
 CGU’s annual report shows that the program has lost breath during Dilma Government. Within 4 
years, the number of municipalities drew fell from almost 5.000 to 1.000. This feel was mainly due to 
budgetary reasons. For more information, check page 49 of 2013 CGU’s Annual Report. Available at: 
http://www.cgu.gov.br/sobre/auditorias/arquivos/2013/relatorio_gestao_cgu_2013.pdf (as of 18 
December 2014) 
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 As mentioned above, monitoring is also done by civil society organization. 
“Às Claras”, "Merítissimos" and “Olho nas Emendas” are monitoring projects 
developed by Transparência Brasil and IFC/Amarribo (Interview 21 and 22); there are 
also mature civil society auditing experiences in the health sector (Interview 15).
31
 
According to one interviewee, involving citizens and the community in those 
practices can bring benefits, since they are closer to the local administration and can 
uncover facts that would go undetected in data analysis or occasional visits made by 
federal monitoring institutions (Interview 15).  
 
3.2. Investigation 
An investigation usually starts from suspects of irregularities and consists in a 
procedure in which proofs and evidence is collected to foment an administrative or 
judicial adjudication procedure. They usually start either through citizens’- sometimes 
public bidding competitors – (Interview 06) - or other institutions’ denounces (oral, 
textual, images, etc.) or through a given institution own initiative. They usually have 
as its result a dossier or a formal document in which findings and evidences collected 
are presented; this document is often sent to another unit – sometimes in the same 
institution, sometimes in another - to start an adjudication procedure when due.
 32
  
In Brazil, there are institutions that deal almost exclusively with investigations 
– like Federal Police and CPIs – while others has it as one of its main functions – like 
CGU, TCU, Ministério Público, Corregedorias, CNJ, CNMP and Ethical Committees. 
There are also some institutions that play a supporting role in investigative practices – 
like COAF and DRCI – fomenting already existing investigative procedures 
developed by other institutions. With all those institutions in charge of investigations, 
it is not uncommon for the same corruption act to have open investigations in 
different institutions without one knowing about each other’s existence. Although 
Brazil has started to implement systems that allow, at least, members from the same 
                                                        
31
 For further information, please visit the projects webpages respectively at: 
http://www.asclaras.org.br/@index.php, www.meritissimos.org.br/ e olhonasemendas.com.br/.  
32
 We have identified this dynamics in the Ministério Público from São Paulo, in which GAECO is 
mainly responsible for investigating corruption cases, but persecution and adjudication is left for 
regular prosecutors.   
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institution (but different units) to see if there is any open investigation about a given 
person or company, coordination is still an issue
33
. 
Note that although investigative procedures do not impose direct sanctions on 
investigates, being the target of an anti-corruption investigation usually brings bad 
attention from the media and some reputational sanctions (at least in the beginning of 
the investigation), what can be personally and professionally damaging. Therefore, 
sometimes, the simple fact of announcing an investigation can already make a corrupt 
practice to be ceased.
34
  
There are administrative and judicial investigations, this latter in civil and 
criminal areas. CGU, TCU, CEP, CNJ and CNMP can all start administrative 
investigative procedures
35
. Civil investigations are carried out by Ministério Público 
through a specific proceeding called inquérito civil público, established by the Public 
Civil Action Law. Criminal investigations are carried out by Ministério Público and 
the Federal Police, sometimes through specialized units that deals with organized 
crime (eg. MP’s Gaeco, DPF’s DICOR). While in criminal investigations Ministério 
Público can request Federal Police to investigate a given fact, a civil investigation (for 
improbity) of the same case cannot count with the police help (Interview 08).
36
  
Not always investigation reports explicitly points out which norms have been 
breached or which crimes or administrative violations were allegedly committed. 
Police reports and CGU investigative reports, for instance, can only bring elements 
and leave conclusions to be taken by the adjudicatory institution (Interview 12).
37
  
Anti-corruption investigations sometimes demands advanced techniques that 
only few institutions like Federal Police, MP and CPIs can use; others have their 
                                                        
33
 Although we did not have access to this system, it was mentioned as a great improvement by one of 
our interviewees (Interview 12). The system was created recently – in November 2012 – in the 
universal day against improbity. For more information about anti-corruption practices in Ministério 
Público, please check http://combateacorrupcao.mpf.mp.br/ (as of December 18, 2014).  
34
 Interviewee 07 reports a concrete case where all elements were set for the commitment of the crime 
and the simple fact of the law enforcement institution "started to gather information and ash for support 
[of other institutions] the public administration suspended the contract that were already signed".  
35
 In the case of CNJ, CNMP and CGU investigative proceedings are mainly based on the  Federal 
Public Employees Law (Law 8.112/90)  
36
 Interviewee 12 also explains that internal opinions from the Federal Police stated that their forensic 
experts cannot work on civil cases under request of the Federal Prosecutors due to the lack of human 
resources and rise of the requests. Exceptions are considered for big cases under special requirement.  
37
 Interviewee 12 explains that TCU, for example, selects, each year, around 400 to 500 big public 
works to audit. After investigation, a report is sent to the Public Prosecutor. In this report, auditor 
might present, at the conclusions, indicia of corruption and other crimes.  
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investigative procedures restricted to targeted data analysis (Interview 04 and 09).
 38
  
In the Federal Police, for instance, an anti-corruption investigation can include 
surveillance of a place or person, use of undercover agents and sting operations, wire-
typing among others practices that require previous judicial authorization in order to 




Investigative procedures can also be classified into proactive or reactive. A 
reactive investigation occurs after the fact was already perpetrated; it is backward 
looking and therefore heavily depends on information and monitoring reports sent by 
other institutions. A proactive investigation, on the other hand, is started while the 
crime is still happening and therefore it is regarded as the "ideal" form of 
investigation, as "the money does not leave the public safer" (Interview 07). While all 
institutions with power to investigate pursue reactive and proactive investigations, the 
number of proactive is still very small when compared to reactive.
40
  
Proactive investigations usually take place as taskforces developed by multiple 
institutions, among them CGU, TCU, Ministério Público and Federal Police 
(Interview 01 and 07).
41
 Since 2006, the number of taskforce operations raised from a 
couple in 2006 to almost 30 in 2012 (Interview 09). Most of those taskforce 
operations occur in a case-basis, normally when personal trust and synergy is 
developed between the staff of different institutions.
42
 Our research have found only 
one permanent and formalized taskforce, the Força Tarefa Previdenciária, in which 
Federal Police, Social Security Ministry and Public Prosecutors office work together 
on frauds related to pension funds for over 10 years now (Interview 07 and 11).
43
 
                                                        
38
 Interview 04 and 09. Also, as interviewee 1 explains “we can frequently identify the problem, the 
unlawful act, the crime, but we can’t find out who were the beneficiaries of the amount diverted. This 
can only be reached through access to telephone and banking records, and other information that only 
the Police and the Prosecutor [are able to get].”  
39
 Interviewee 02 highlights that "special techniques of investigation" are necessary as in corruption 
cases much is done to erase the tracks of the crime. Interviewee 07 explains that the special techniques 
are the ones that require judicial authorization (wire-typing, searching and freezing). The ordinary 
techniques, also used in corruption investigations, are surveillance of a place or person, use of 
undercover agents and sting operations.  
40
 Interview 05 and 07.   
41
 Taskforces might also be reactive when the operation is organized to in view of an ongoing 
investigation in one of the institutions.   
42
 Interviewee 02, for example, explains that different bodies can take the initiative of a joint 
investigation and after a certain time, in certain places, this relation gets stronger. And in these cases, 
there are “trust”, “chemistry”, “synergy” among the actors. And when a positive result is reached, more 
cases follow and a routine of working together is created.  
43
 Interview 07 and 11. Interviewee 11 sums up why he believes taskforces work: “you put in the same 
room the guy taking care of internal controls, the guy from investigation and the one from law 
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Finally, some institutions participate both in investigation and adjudication 
proceedings as secondary players, helping primary actors to gather enough 
information. DRCI is one of them, supporting Brazilian authorities to gather evidence 
and establish communication with foreign authorities. COAF, Brazilian FIU, might 
also participate in investigative proceedings providing financial reports and analysis.
44
   
The media has also an important role in investigating anti-corruption cases – the 
so-called investigative journalism, an activity pursued by traditional media 
corporation groups, but also emerging political blogs. Some governmental 
investigators (as Federal Police officers or Public Prosecutors) cooperate with 
journalists, releasing information that can be useful for them if published and 
receiving information from the media in order to give a certain journalist the power to 
participate in some of its operations and having priority over other journalists in the 
release of information (Interview 02). Other institutions, like Federal Police, has a 
more rigid relation with the media and police officers has to be granted prior hand 




Differently from the last two components, adjudication usually presupposes a 
three party system, in which you have two opposite parts (plaintiff and defendant) and 
a neutral part (the one who will judge). Usually, anti-corruption institutions either 
play the role of plaintiff or judge, seldom being the defendant. However, AGU is 
sometimes called to defend public institutions and authorities that are being 
prosecuted, especially in international courts (Interview 05).
 
While in judicial 
processes those involved in accusing and judging are from different institutions, in 
administrative procedures they are usually from the same institutions – although not 
always from the same sub-unit.
 45
 Administrative procedures are usually more 
                                                                                                                                                              
enforcement… and they will sit in the same room to discuss one concrete case. So it works.”  
44
 The value of the evidence produced by COAF was at least once considered insufficient by Brazilian 
Superior Justice Court (STJ) as legal base for granting access to bank and telephone records of the 
defendant. In view of that all the criminal investigation was dismissed. For more information, please 
check http://www.conjur.com.br/2011-set-21/leia-voto-ministro-sebastiao-reis-anular-provas-sarney 
(as of December 18, 2014) or have access the original decision here: http://www.conjur.com.br/dl/voto-
ministro-stj-sarney.pdf. 
45
 Usually, in corruption judicial adjudication procedures the plaintiffs are Ministério Público or 
another interested federal institution (like a foundation that had its money illegally spent by an 
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simplified than judicial procedures, especially those designed in the last decade. 
Furthermore, some administrative adjudication procedures have investigation and 
adjudication phases hard to distinguish. Usually administrative adjudication 
proceedings are also sent to the Ministério Público after they are concluded and they 
can also eventually become civil and/or criminal cases (Interview 03). CNJ “Goal 
18”, mentioned above, shows there’s no common practice in this regard in state or 
federal level. The relation between the total amount of criminal actions and civil 
actions within the same court varies substantially.
46
  
Adjudication proceedings usually starts from an investigation or another 
adjudication procedure sent by another institution. It usually presupposes the 
guarantee of the due process and rights of defense and concludes with a binding 
decision from a judge. When this binding decision attributes responsibility to the 
defendant, it usually imposes one or more sanctions. When the defendant does not 
voluntarily defers to the sanction - or the authority has all it’s needed to guarantee its 
imposition, as happens with the dismissal – a enforcement proceeding starts, 
frequently lead by a different unit.
47
 
Procedures can be judicial, either in the civil area (public civil action and 
popular action) or in the criminal area; or administrative, like those taken in TCU or 
in the different correction (CGU, CEP) or ethical institutions/sub-units. Not only 
procedure requirements and steps change according to its nature/area, but also the 
range of possible sanctions and decisions that can be imposed. Note that different 
adjudication procedures can go on at the same time in different areas in autonomously 
matters, while some can wait for others decision before issuing its own – like CEP 
waiting for TCU (Interview 10).
48
   
                                                                                                                                                              
administrator). Citizens can, sometimes, start these procedures as well, however the Ministério Público 
can intervene in the case. However, adjudication procedures are also carried inside TCU (where the 
accuser and the judge both belongs to the same institution) or in other institutions dealing with 
correction or ethics (as Corregedorias and Ethics Committees). 
46
 While in some State Courts, as Ceara and Bahia, the number of criminal and civil actions are similar 
(around 2.000), in others there are much more criminal than civil actions (in Minas Gerais,  more than 
16.000 criminal actions were identified and less than 4.000 civil actions). The opposite also happens: in 
Rio Grande do Sul, for example, were identified 565 civil actions and 55 criminal actions. For a 
discussion and detailed description of this numbers, see Machado, Maira. “Crime e/ou improbidade? 
Notas sobre a performance do sistema de justice em casos de corrupção. Revista Brasileira de Ciências 
Criminais, forthcoming.   
47
 Note that in Brazil public employees might be subjected to different sanctions; while a regular 





 Interviewee 10 explains CEP suspends the decision until TCU concludes their proceeding about the 
same person and the same facts “to avoid unfairness”. 
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Differently from most Latin American countries, Brazil has civil adjudicatory 
procedures for anti-corruption; the public civil action together with improbity law 
gives the possibility of concomitant anti-corruption persecution in criminal and civil 
spheres, duplicating institutional actors and frameworks. Sanctions in both 
proceedings are different; while criminal adjudication might lead to imprisonment, 
civil adjudication usually imposes prohibitions to assume public office or to contract 
with public administration for a given period of time. Both proceedings impose fines.  
In criminal adjudication, passive and active corruption, money laundry, tax 
evasion and organized crime are the main crimes related to anti-corruption legislation. 
Although Brazilian statistics on that topic are for many reasons not reliable, according 




Administrative adjudication is mainly pursued in three different areas: CGU’s 
internal affairs system, TCU’s Tomada de Contas Especial and Ethics Committee. 
While in CGU or TCU sanctions can include dismissal, fines and prohibitions to hire 
with public administration, ethics adjudication leads only to a public warning. As 
mentioned above, administrative adjudication is usually more simplified than judicial 
procedures and follow less strict rules: in correction procedures (correição), for 
instance, investigators and adjudicators are not individuals specialized in those tasks, 
but public employees – with or without training – that are selected ad hoc to perform 
those activities (Interview 01).
 50
 Even though administrative procedures are supposed 
to guarantee the same constitutional rights of defense required at judicial proceedings, 
the defendant still have the right to ask for judicial review for all administrative 
decisions.
51
 This leads to creation of judicial procedures to discuss the exact same 
content of the administrative ones; however, now the game is played by different 
institutions and rules for evidence gathering are different. Many cases are reversed in 
judicial courts not due to a wrongful content analysis, but due to procedures’ failures 
occurred during the process (Interview 01). Corregedorias and TCU are aware of that 
and have been trying taking extra care to not commit those failures; however, the lack 
                                                        
49
 For a discussion about the reliability of these numbers, see Machado (forthcoming). 
50
 Among training programs we have found, we highlight TCU Instituto Serzedello Côrrea and 
Superior School of the Magistrature and Ministério Público, responsible for offering professional 
training to its members. Programs like TCU’s Diálogos Públicos and program CAPACITA, developed 
by CGU.  
51
 Brazilian Federal Constitution established in its article 5º, XXXV, that the law should not exclude 
from the Judicial review any injury or threat to the law. 
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of feedback of what happened to their process after they forwarded to another 
institution (like being considered irregular by the judicial court) makes identification 
of these problems harder.  
In order to better structure adjudication procedures inside each institution, 
many have created coordination units that provides orientation, establish common 
norms, asserts its jurisdiction (avocar) over some procedures and join adjudication 
themselves. In internal affairs, CGU, CNJ and CNMP all have those units (Interviews 




 Chamber of 
Commission and Revision (Interview 14).
52 
 
Despite those coordination efforts, involved actors still feel there is a long way 
ahead. Especially in what concerns adjudication, our research has struggled to find 
coordination mechanisms. Although corruption judicial adjudication cases tend to be 
complex and to involve groups of people with significant political power and access 
to good lawyers that usually explore all the possible appeals existent, the Judiciary, 
Ministério Público and Federal Police still cooperate very little outside the task-force 
operation schemes.  
The existing statute of limitation laws makes the situation even more 
challenging, since the limitation is defined by the sanction (in the law or in the 
sentence) and not by the complexity of the case, number of defendants, international 
connections or law enforcement institutions involved. From the public authorities 
perspective, the limitation period in corruption cases is often insufficient to conclude 
adjudications and when it is reached it makes the whole procedure invalid and wastes 
hundreds of work-hours from public employees (Interview 14).
 
Defendants also have 
on their sides the lack of institutional incentive for judges to prioritize corruption 
cases. The promotion at the judicial career, for example, takes into account 
performance data that gives judges equal points for each decision, unregard of its 




Another key feature of Brazilian adjudication procedures in corruption cases is 
“special forum” (foro privilegiado). According to the set of norms ruling the matter, 
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 MP’s CCRs aims to connect and solve controversies among prosecutors working in related cases; it 
tries to solve “collective problems” and fix interpretations by hearing the parts involved and issuing 
understanding that, although not binding, can be useful to prosecutors from different regions. For more 
information, check http://www.pgr.mpf.mp.br/areas-de-atuacao/camaras-de-coordenacao-e-revisao (as 
of December 18, 2014).  
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there are three levels of courts of appeal that are competent to adjudicate criminal 
cases involving public authorities. The level of the appeal court is defined according 
to ranking of the public official
53
. Cases involving multiple defendants – public 
authorities and citizens – might either go altogether to the appeal court or be split into 
parts in a way that special forum is only granted to public authorities. In the case of 
federal high-ranking officials, the Supreme Federal Court holds the special forum - 
what, being the highest court in the country, leave the defendants without the 
possibility to appeal from the decision.  It’s worth pointing out that there is no special 
forum at civil proceedings for improbity and therefore cases involving the same 
defendants might be investigated and prosecuted by different levels of jurisdiction.    
 
3.4. Sanctioning  
Sanctioning (or sentencing) is a key procedure rarely taken into consideration 
by the public opinion; even legal debate that tends to see the imposition of the 
sanction at the sentence or “the arrest” as the end of that case. Enforcing sanctions 
however requires new procedures to either manage prison time, to guarantee the 
payment of a fine or to return diverted money to the Public Administration. 
This is valid both for administrative, civil and criminal procedures. In Brazil, 
the enforcement of criminal decisions is also a separate judicial proceeding carried 
out by a judge and prosecutor based at the “criminal enforcement section”, therefore 
different from those that participated during the adjudication phase
54
.    
 In the civil domain at the federal level, the main actor is AGU. AGU is 
responsible for enforcing fines and compensation for damages from judicial and non-
judicial (TCU, CGU mainly) adjudication procedures, when they are not voluntarily 
paid. The key unit, as mentioned before, is “Grupo de Atuação Proativa”. AGU is also 
responsible to recover assets sent overseas, especially to tax havens or other countries; 
AGU International Department works closely with DRCI, COAF and other such like 
international institutions. 
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 For a whole explanation of foro privilegiado, its origins and changes during the XXth century, see 
Ferreira 2014.  
54
 For a discussion about the enforcement of sanctions in corruption case, see Carolina Ferreira, 2014, 
describing the proceeding of Nicolau dos Santos Neto at the TRT Case. . 
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 Usually, low value fines are paid and some of those convicted opt to pay its 
debt in monthly installments, a possibility offered by administrative units.
55
 Although 
fines can be, within the limits of the law, freely stipulated by adjudicatory institutions 
(the one’s who judge), institutions should take into consideration other fines when 
fixing its value; that is, assets recovery procedures can be determined by different 
institutions, however the overall recovered money cannot exceed the total debt. Some 
other administrative sanctions are enforced by the public administration itself, like 
demission of public employees (Interview 19). 
Despite all those efforts, according to estimates of our interviewees, only a 
very small percentage (less than 5%) of all diverted assets are ever recovered 
(Interview 06 and 18). Sanction enforcement procedures are also subjected to appeals 
and when the debt is about to be executed, many defendants already have no assets 
left in their name, making the whole procedure useless. Therefore AGU tries to make 
conciliations when possible. Along the year, it usually promotes the “month of 
conciliation” where proposals and better payment conditions are made to those in debt 
due to anti-corruption procedures as well (Interview 13). 
Civil society also somehow enforces sanctions, although not formally. Using 
the tactics of "embarrassment", they enforce shaming sanctions against public 
officials, a procedure that due to its simplicity can have more effective results than 
official/formal ones (Interview 21)
56
. A lot of times, those shaming sanctions will 
actually be the only sanction the corruptor will in fact face. However, that practice is 
dangerous and numerous are those cases that media and civil society condemns 
someone without evidence and imposes an undue sanction for innocent people (or, at 
least, without the necessary evidence to make those claims) - like the Veja case 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter.  
 Prohibitions of contracting out with or being hired by federal administration - 
another recurrent civil or administrative sanction - needs to be carried out by each 
administrative unit so they can make the prohibition effective. Databases with names 
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 We highlight that some of those sanctioned to pay fines due to their involvement in the Mensalão 
case made crowd-funding to obtain funds to pay  them (José Dirceu e José Genoíno). For more 
information, check http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2014/02/dirceu-arrecada-mais-de-r-1-milhao-
para-pagar-multa-do-mensalao.html (as of December 18, 2014).  
56
 An example mentioned in our interviews was the creation of the Popular Transparency Index, that 
evaluated district representative’s websites. With the help of the media, it became popular in Distrito 
Federal and made the responsible NGO to be contacted by several representatives. To view the index, 
please access http://www.sitranspdf.org.br/.  
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and details of those sanctioned with prohibition to contract with Federal 
administrations - like Cadastro Nacional de Improbidade and Cadastro de Empresas 
Inidôneas e Suspensas – were created very recently, in the last five years , in order to 
facilitate access and assure those prohibitions enforcement.
57
 These databases 
function not only as an effective way to reduce the costs of enforcing those sanctions, 
but also as a way to publicize sanctions and, perhaps, dissuade others to commit the 
same corrupt acts.  
 
3.5. Publicity of enforcement 
Every year, all federal institutions are required to publish annual management 
reports (relatórios de gestão) in which they describe activities pursued and sometimes 
publish statistics about its performance, what can include number of proceedings 
made in that year and, sometimes, convictions and sanctions imposed.
 
In every federal 
institution webpage, one might find statistical data concerning its personnel, expenses 
and activities; annual reports with an overall assessment of their activities are easily 
located online. However, this closed-format information (usually a PDF) or hard to 
understand files (like CSV files) are not always fully intelligible for most of the 
people. Annual reports, for instance, are not very detailed and contain statistical 
information that is usually aggregated in categories without further explanations on 
how the data was collected or what they actually mean. We highlight that these 
problems are not present in all institutions with the same intensity or degree. Data 
concerning Ministério Público numbers are much less detailed than data released by 
COAF, for instance.  
There are at least two ways in which enforcement is publicized: by (i) direct 
disclosing information about individual cases or about procedures and sanctions 
enforced or by (ii) indirect disclosure through the media or NGOs. 
In the Judiciary, CNJ has required every court to identify how many cases of 
corruption and improbity were pending and report whenever each was judged
58
.  
“Goal 18” – as it is named – published in late 2013 the total amount of anti-corruption 
cases in civil and criminal areas, differentiating those concluded and those pending; it 
                                                        
57
 Some of possible sanctions to applied in the Federal level like prohibitions to contract with a 
company that has been sanctioned are listed in article 12 from Law 8.429/92.  
58
 See http://www.cnj.jus.br/gestao-e-planejamento/metas/metas-2013/meta-18 (as of October 30 2014) 
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also shows the same data per court. That has contributed to create a context that gave 
substantial visibility for state-performance.
59
 Civil society and the media may consult 
the CNJ website to verify the level of accomplishment of the goal by court – all state 
appellate courts and superior courts – and help to translate that information for the 
general public. As a purely quantitative measurement of number of cases sentenced 
out of the total of cases identified in each court, the accomplishment rate, however, 
does not cover the quality of the decisions.   
There are also statistics on incarceration produced by each state - those 
competent to run the penitenciary system – and compiled by the federal Minister of 
Justice that publishes national results in a system called Infopen. The same production 
procedure applies for “Goal 18”, in which CNJ compiles data provided by state 
courts.  
Although those statistics help to draw a timid overview of law enforcement 
institutions activities in Brazil, they are not very helpful to assess the performance of 
current anti-corruption system as whole. Governmental reports state only annual 
numbers of procedures in each phase alone (monitoring or investigation or 
adjudication or sanction enforcement); there is no easy way to track cases between 
phases or institutions – that is from/to monitoring, investigation, adjudication and 
sanction enforcement.  In other words, it is impossible to determine, for instance, how 
many investigations lead to adjudicatory procedures in which sanctions were 
determined, neither how many of those were actually successfully enforced (and how 
much funds were recovered). 
Publicity of enforcement also takes place through recent experiences of 
“registering” public employees and companies that were convicted (like the 
Cadastros mentioned in the section above) or those who hold a clean sheet. An 
example of this last sort is the Cadastro Pró-Ética (Pro-Ethics Seal), an initiative 
developed by CGU Prevention and civil society. The idea is to publicly recognize 
companies that are seriously committed with ethics and anti-corruption policies. As of 
the end of 2013, only 12 companies succeeded in obtaining the seal but several others 
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 Piaui, for example, shows the lower rate of accomplishment of the goal (16%) regarding criminal 
actions judging 8 out of the 48 actions identified. Amapa shows the higher rate, also among criminal 
actions (98%), judging 504 out of the 515 actions identified.  
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have tried (Interview 01)
60
. The seal aims to bring positive reinforcement and benefits 
for those who comply with anti-corruption laws.  
We highlight that publicity of enforcement can theoretically lead to general 
dissuasion effects. However, in order for that to happen, the role of the media and 
NGOs in translating technical information and taking it to those more prone to 
commit those crimes are essential. Publishing reports that no one reads (although 
everyone can have access) or statistics that are often complex of incomplete does not 
seem to be able to dissuade no one. However, in this information is translated to a 
more digested language, dissuasion effects might arise. Mensalão case, for instance, is 
often regarded as one of the first cases in which high level politicians were arrested 
for more than a couple of weeks. The current Lava-Jato taskforce was one of the first 
operations in which high level businessman were arrested, even though it was 
provisory prison. Those cases were highly reported in the media what lead to a very 
wide publicization of its enforcement procedures.   
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4. Coordination mechanisms  
Coordination has very blurred definition. As Peters (forthcoming) puts it 
“coordination is both a process through which decisions are brought together and an 
outcome of that process”. It seems to involve a set of decisions and actions that take 
into consideration procedures developed by other institutional units. It is not only 
working together in concrete, but also sharing information and knowledge about its 
needs and developing procedures that can better dialogue with each other. It is about 
creating formal and informal structures and procedures that allow better achievement 
of everyone’s goals and the whole anti-corruption system goals. 
As Peters (forthcoming) points out, not always coordination is “voluntary and 
based on normative agreements”, but a good deal “is the result of either coercion or 
the use of incentives”. There are certainly various levels of coordination and different 
forms to achieve it. In fact, there are even institutions – like ENCCLA – that have 
coordination of anti-corruption strategies as its main goal. In our research, we have 
tried to identify some of those coordination strategies developed by institutions 
studied. Coordination is not always the case, however. Institutions also compete with 
each other to strengthen its power and budget. As Peters points out, “politics at an 
organizational level is about defending the organizations turf. Turf […] represents the 
things that the organizations holds dear, and fears are threatened by other 
organizations, such as money, space, and time (Bardach, 1996)”.  
During this research we have identified five possible interactions between two 
or more institutions or sub-units in the anti-corruption domain. Firstly, they can 
simply do not take into account the work developed by other institutions in all or in 
some of those procedures and tasks it develops daily. That is, they can (i) ignore the 
work developed by others. In our research, we have identified that federal and state 
level auditing institutions (Tribunal de Contas) hardly exchange information with 
each other regarding the irregularities they find during their monitoring and 
investigative procedures. However, institutitons and sub-units can take into account 
the work developed by others and (ii) act independently and compete, like sometimes 
the Federal Police and Ministério Público to what concerns investigative procedures 
or even sub-units of Ministério Público (GAECO vs. general)
61
.  Or they can (iii) act 
independently and but acknowledge indirect interference. An example would be when 
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 GAECO is a sub-unit from Ministério Público from the State of São Paulo in charge of investigating 
organized crimes. Currently it mainly deals with drug-dealing and political corruption.  
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CGU acknowledges that its monitoring and investigative reports could be used in a 
criminal investigation led by the Federal Police or adjudicatory procedure by MP and, 
therefore, tries to point out criminal evidence and collect evidence that can be later 
used in court. On the other hand, where there is some degree of coordination, 
institutions (iv) can work independently and coordinate their actions or (v) work 
together.  
This chapter focus on this two last types of coordination and brings different 
examples below.  Next sections will present four types of relationships between 
different institutional units organized according to the types of procedures. Using the 
binomials different/same and institutions/activities, we can distinguish 4 different 




4.1. Same function and same institution 
As already mentioned above what we regard as an institution can be broken 
into a combination of institutional units. It is interesting to highlight that coordination 
among units of the same institution can be a very hard task to achieve. After all, some 
institutions are present in dozens of cities in Brazil (MP, TCU, Courts, CGU, DPF); 
some do not have anti-corruption as its exclusive goal (MP, Courts, DPF, Congress); 
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in MP 
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others have a more tight/hierarchical one (CGU or DPF). To make things more 
complex, sometimes multiple sub-units from the same institution are involved to 
pursue the same activity. In TCU adjudication procedure, for instance, 3 different sub-
units are involved: fiscalization unit, MP in TCU and Ministers;
 
each makes a report 
that will be taken into consideration by the Plenarium when taking their decision.  
Institutions also vary according to their rules and format. While some are more 
hierarchical, others are horizontal; these different configurations certainly play a role 
in the ways in which coordination can be achieved and can foster better results. 
Ministério Público members – prosecutors – have “functional autonomy” secured by 
the Constitution, meaning that “when he believes he has to act, he doesn’t ask or 
consult anyone. When he [a prosecutor] receives the information he can open an 
investigation or, if he believes he has enough evidence already, he can propose the 
[civil or criminal] action directly” (Interview 12). That can lead to multiple 
prosecutions being initiated in different cities thousand of kilometers away from each 
other – especially in big public procurement procedures where actors act nationwide – 
without one necessarily taking the other into consideration.  
All these factors bring different intra-coordination issues that need to be taken 
into consideration. We have mainly identified four different ways in which 
coordination was being fostered in this category. The first is (i) through the 
establishment of a central unit and strengthening hierarchical control. Hierarchical 
institutions, like CGU, TCU or Federal Police, usually have a sub-unit in Brasília that 
plans which activities and/or operations they are going to execute (Interview 07).
 
Execution, however, is usually done by local units located across the country; seldom 
those that plan really execute it (Interview 01). This procedure is perceived to 
facilitate central coordination as it avoids having different sub-units working at the 
same time at the same topic in an uncoordinated manner. CGU has also experienced 
the creation of units to deal with topics that were decentralized between different 
units. Secretaria de Prevenção, created in 2006, for instance, unified all orientation 
and prevention proceedings (Interview 01). Corregedorias from CGU, CNJ e CNMP 
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about disciplinary procedures existent in all Federal level. (Interview 19) 
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Secondly coordination might result of (ii) sharing efforts, data and information 
collected by different units in the same function and in the same institution. In 
Ministério Público, different sub-units deal with investigation or adjudication 
procedures in criminal or civil areas. Therefore, there can be two investigation 
procedures or adjudication procedures going on at the same time, being led by 
different prosecutors. Although prosecutors are not obliged to share their efforts or 
evidences, this seems to be a growing concern inside the institution. In 2011, 
ENCCLA recommended Ministério Público to unify civil and criminal atributions in 
dealing with corruption and improbity (Recommendation 03/2011)
 63
. In 2012, a 
system was developed in which prosecutors can insert information about their cases 
and consult to see if there is any open investigation or adjudication procedure with the 
same people involved.  
We have identified that sometimes different sub-units can just work together 
in one phase (investigation) and then move apart in the next (adjudication).
 
Also, 
cooperation and evidence gathering seems more common when the original case 
started in the criminal sphere and then moved to improbity, than the other way around 
(Interview 14).  
The third way was (iii) through the creation of specialized groups focused on 
anti-corruption in institutions that does not have it as its only goal. Federal Public 
Prosecutor (MPF) has created specialized sub-units to coordinate anti-corruption 
procedures at the appeals level (CCRs). The CCR try to connect and solve 
controversies among prosecutors working with related cases; it tries to solve 
“collective problems” and fix interpretations by hearing the parts involved and issuing 
understanding that, although not binding, can support prosecutors from different 
regions. As mentioned above, AGU also created a group dedicated full time to anti-
corruption and improbity cases (Grupo de Atuação Pro-Ativa). At first, that group 
would only propose enforcement procedures; now, however, they are also have to 
manage them, what is consuming a lot of resources and have decreased the number of 
new actions pursued every year (Interview 13). 
Finally, we have also identified (iv) forums in which representatives from 
different units talk to each other and develop common goals. Fórum Nacional de 
Gestão do MP gathers all representative of MP from all over the country to discuss 
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themes related to MP management area, personnel management, public bidding 
processes and contracts, budgets, internal control, among other things (Interview 13). 
Even if not directly related to law enforcement, this sort of meeting strengthens 
personal relationship and inter-personal trust which proved to be a key component of 
coordination strategies, as discussed below.  
 
4.2. Different function and same institution 
Two examples of institutions that performs multiple activities are: MP that 
performs investigation and adjudication and CGU that performs monitoring, 
investigation and, when related to public employees’ rights and duties, adjudication 
and sanction enforcement. These tasks are usually performed by different units inside 
that same institution - there are exceptions however, like MP prosecutors that can start 
investigation and adjudication procedures (Interview 02). Therefore, coordination 
usually took place through the (i) creation of central units for coordination or (ii) 
through the joint planning of actions together. 
In CGU, the Executive Secretary is the institution responsible to coordinate 
units from different functions and “make the bridge between the Minister office and 
the other areas”. When there is, for example, an auditing proceeding (auditoria) in 
which public employees are involved, SFC (Internal Control) and Corregedorias are 
the ones to deal with that case. The Executive Secretary role is then to facilitate 
communication between those areas; however, it only makes this bridge in some 
cases, usually the more complex ones (Interview 16). In AGU, there are also 
occasions in which a consultancy unit and prosecution units (adjudication or sanction 
enforcement) develop joint works, in which the first brings knowledge to foment an 
adjudicatory strategy, contribute to draft initial documents and work together to 
define settlement strategies (Interview 13). 
 
4.3. Same function and different institution 
There are enforcement procedures that are better performed when different 
expertises are integrated to accomplish the same goal, like investigation. An anti-
corruption investigation usually requires accountant analysis, financial intelligence 




institutions cannot develop all this types of analysis alone and some sort of 
coordination is regarded as essential (Interview 01 and 11). That is also the case when 
it is necessary to gather evidence for an administrative investigation that can only be 
obtained through a previous judicial authorization, that often needs to be requested by 
another institution.  
Some institutions have units that have the main task of making this 
interinstitutional articulation. In CGU, for example, there is a Diretoria de Operação 
Especiais in Brasília that plans this interaction between CGU and other institutions in 
taskforces, for example. Regional units cannot decide by themselves to create 
taskforce operations, for example, as NAE – Núcleo de Ações Estratégicas – is the 
one who deals with others institutions (Interview 01).  
In order to address those issues, coordination takes place in at least two 
different ways. The first is the creation of task forces and joint operations (Interview 
06).
 
In the last decade, the most famous corruption cases in Brazil were born one or 
two years before they got media attention, usually by taskforces involving actors like 
CGU, DPF, MPE, MPF, Federal, Banco Central, COAF (Interview 01). The number 
of task forces operations is rising each year – more than 30 in 2013 according to the 
information provided by the Federal Police (Interview 07). 
Although MP is involved in different taskforce operations, its functional 
autonomy also makes harder for other institutions to guarantee MP participation in 
these joint-procedures; the decision to join or not the taskforce is entirely up to 
individual Prosecutors (Interview 01). However, MP usually works close to the police 
in criminal investigations (Interview 02); even though that is not a routine, 
interviewees often regarded it as desirable (Interviews 02 and 05), as it prevents that 
evidence collected by the Police can later be declared insufficient or even disregarded 
by a criminal judge, among other problems. Note that taskforces are not a routine, but 
are implemented only in some cases, after careful assessment and other institutions 
willingness to participate (Interview 07). Brazil has only one example of a permanent 
task-force; one devoted to frauds to Pension Funds (Força Tarefa Previdenciária) that 
integrates MPF, DPF and Pension Funds Ministry (Interview 07).  
 Secondly, coordination also takes place through the adoption of common 
standards and behaviors that have the potential to benefit the work of other 
institutions – things like paying attention to common deadlines or looking and 
reporting elements that can be useful for their actions. Communication between these 
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organizations, when it is not sharp, might represent a huge problem, especially when 
several organizations are involved. Delays from one institution in giving an answer or 
forwarding reports can cause delays to the whole procedure and have direct impact on 
the work developed by other institutions (Interview 05). Units can also work closer to 
each other and sometimes ask the help from each other to interpret data and evidence 
that they do not have the skills or are not competent to do themselves (Interview 07).
 
 
Coordination does not occur at the same degree between different levels 
(international, federal, state and local). At the international arena, coordination is 
perceived as more intense especially when AGU, DRCI and others get involved in the 
same activity or case. AGU even coordinate their work with private actors, like 
international law firms responsible to adjudicate in the name of Brazilian government 
overseas (Interview 05). At the state level, on the other hand, TCU and TCE, for 
instance, hardly share information or invest in joint investigative efforts, but they do 
work with other institutions (Interview 03). 
   
4.4. Different function and different institution 
This is perhaps the level in which most coordination problems arise. As shown 
above, anti-corruption strategies build on each other and a monitoring or investigative 
procedure developed by one institution will likely be used by another institution to 
perform another activity (i.e. COAF monitors financial transactions, send this 
information for TCU to build a investigation, that will send this procedure for MP to 
adjudicate in Courts, that will be used by AGU to enforce that sanction) (Interview 
01). Institutions need to be aware that their reports will eventually be forwarded to 
different institutions that are composed by employees with different training and that 
are assigned to develop particular tasks that require certain cares and information. 
And also that those reports can be forwarded to other institutions in the future 
(Interview 10).  
Brazilian law requires that most institutions forward their reports and 
decisions to others once the procedure is finished. Depending on which violations the 
institution perceives in a case, it chooses who it will send it to: if a crime, to 
Ministério Público or Polícia Federal; if assets recovery or sanctioning, to AGU, etc. 
(Interviews 03 and 09).  
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These information and reports are sent to the institution and not to a particular 
sub-unit; therefore the institution decides who is going to receive or internally process 
that information – if it goes to the civil, criminal or both areas – is something decided 
by the receiving institution and not the one who sends the report or information 
(Interview 09).  
To address those issues, we have noted that coordination between different 
institutions and different procedures also took place in at least two different ways. 
The first involves the assignment for a given unit of the task to identify institutions for 
which a given information would be useful to. In CGU, for instance, one of Secretaria 
Federal de Controle Interno’s main role is to find relevant information about possible 
corruption practices and figure out to which institutions would be interested in 
receiving it and how soon that document must be sent (timing issues) to avoid that 
procedures become useless in the close future due to statute of limitations restrictions, 
for example (Interviews 01 and 09).  
The second way is also through task-force operations. Although most 
institutions have broad goals, most do not have enough resources and powers to 
independently fulfill its goals. An examples is CGU: its goals are broad (evaluate, 
control, fiscalize), but its procedural capabilities have strict limits; CGU cannot 
adjudicate except in cases of disciplinary actions; it cannot use special investigation 
techniques, like infiltration or telephone “bugs”, it needs other institutions to gather 
that evidence (Interview 09). Although some taskforces operations and networks can 
involve multiple activities – usually investigation and adjudication together - 
sanctioning institutions – like AGU – are hardly invited for them. It is true that 
including AGU could bring direct benefits, either because a earlier strategy to assure 
that a defendant will still have property in his name to guarantee part of his potential 
sanction in the case this arises is highly desirable or simply because information 
gathered in sanction enforcement can also be shared with investigators and 
adjudicators start a new case.
 
 Note, however, that these are rarely done. 
Not always the activity and interaction flux between different institutions is 
the same in both directions. MP, for instance, demands a lot of information from CGU 
(Interview 16); although CGU sends them a lot of reports, they do not request too 
much information (Interview 09). However, MP – and almost all institutions that do 
request or receive information from others to foment their procedures – hardly give 
any feedback of what was done with that information or procedure to the institution or 
 38 
unit that forward it. Feedback, when done, is made in a case-by-case basis (Interviews 
14 and 16).  
Interaction between institutions can also get turbulent sometimes: prosecutors 
can get angry when CGU refuses to cooperate as requested or can simply ignore their 
requests (that is considered to be very rare though - Interview 09). The relationship 
between CGU and TCU, on the other hand, is described as positive: TCU and CGU 
jointly select those units that will be subjected to CGU monitoring procedures and 
later be send to TCU for their assessment (Interview 01).  
COAF also has an important role in sending monitoring information for other 
institutions to perform their jobs. Its final reports - RIFs (Relatórios de Informação 
Financeira) foment different institutions, especially DPF and MP and, to a lesser 
extent, TCU and CGU (Interview 08). International coordination in this area is also 
present and done by DRCI (Interview 11).  
There are also some forum initiatives that regard coordination between 
different institutions and different procedures. Rede de Controle da Gestão Pública, 
for instance, created the possibility of joint work between different institutions in a 
more permanent forum; however, it lost its importance and force in the last years, 
especially after the president of TCU – and its creator – left its job (Interviews 06 and 
14).
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Overall, this chapter depicts Brazil as a country in which a wide range of 
institutional sub-units interact in pursuing different procedures to enforce anti-
corruption law. This scenario seems to be the result of an incremental development 
intensified with the promulgation of the Federal Constitution in 1988. We can cluster 
developments in three main periods: the 1990’s, a period marked by the creation and 
implementation of several institutions and landmark laws; the 2000’s, with the 
strengthening of internal control and a rising concern for efficiency and coordination; 
the 2010’s, with more transparency, popular participation, intensification of anti-
corruption procedures including the business sector.  
As showed above, anti-corruption procedures are spread out in multiple 
legislative areas, like criminal, civil, administrative, internal affairs, ethics, was makes 
possible the same corrupt act to have multiple procedures running at the same time. 
This institutional multiplicity leads to a modular system, in which when one 
institution does not take action, there is usually another that can perform a similar task 
and keep the system moving - be it in the same area (civil, criminal, administrative, 
ethical) or not. However, adjudication is mainly dependent on Ministério Público and 
Judiciary; when these don’t act or take too long to do so, only auditing or ethical 
proceedings can be enforced. This “bottle-neck” effect is created by dominant judicial 
interpretations of articles of the Federal Constitution that states that “the law shall not 
exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration of the Judicial Power” 
(art. 5, XXXV) and that “no one shall be deprived of freedom or of his assets without 
the due process of law” (art. 5 LIV). That interpretation makes all administrative 
adjudications (like those from CGU, CNJ or even TCU) subjected to judicial review 
and therefore deprived of efficacy. Sanction enforcement faces a similar situation; 
AGU, MP and Judiciary are almost the only actors that can enforce criminal or 
patrimonial sanctions (fines, restitutions, etc.). This generates a great workload for 
AGU, since it has to handle with a great amount of procedures started by a wide range 
of anti-corruption institutions. 
Although coordination has been significantly improved during last decades, it 
is important to note that not always institutions coordinate with each other. 
Competition is sometimes reinforced by the fact that institutions usually fight to 
protect their turf - be it demanding exclusivity to pursue a given procedure (ex: 
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Federal Police in criminal investigation) or simply not cooperating with others 
requests (ex: judge that do not allow criminal investigation documents gathered by 
Federal Police to be shared with CPIs, like in Lava Jato taskforce).
65
 As this research 
is mainly based in interviews with key-actors, experiences of successful coordination 
were described in much more detail than situations of conflict and competition.  
Institutional vanity also plays a significant role in fostering competition or in 
making coordination challenging between anti-corruption institutions. Sometimes, 
institutions decide not to share their cases with others in order to be the ones to 
receive credit for uncovering big corruption cases; according to interviewees, this is a 
problem Federal Police frequently faces (Interview 07). Most of the biggest 
operations that are credited and seen as uncovered by the Federal Police often started 
in another institution (like CGU) and are the result of a collective task-force 
operation; however, the Federal Police is the one who usually win the laurels as is the 
one who makes arrests and other procedures that are more appealing to the media and 
visible to the public.  
Brazilian institutions have implemented different formal coordination 
mechanisms like creation of new institutions to centralize planning and to distribute 
tasks among its units; the creation of new information exchange channels between 
and inside institutions, like forums and databases integration; the popularization of 
taskforce operations and pro-active investigations; among others. However, informal 
mechanisms were also extremely important to make all those initiatives work. After 
all, it takes more than signing papers and formalizing institutional partnerships to 
facilitate coordination to actual take place. 
As several of our interviewees mentioned, in Brazil personal trust seems to be 
an invisible ingredient that not only greases existing coordination mechanisms and 
makes them work better, but also allows new coordination and institutional 
relationships to take place. Anti-corruption procedures usually deal with sensitive and 
confidential information, that sometimes have among its target governmental 
employees; public officers do not feel confortable sharing those data with people they 
do not personally trust. It seems that there is little institutional trust among sub-units – 
be it in the inter- or even intra-institutional level. Collective forums, like ENCCLA, 
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and institutional events are regarded as good mechanism to not only discuss and 
cooperate in a procedural level, but also to build ties and trust among personnel. As 
we have heard in our interviews, big anti-corruption investigations and adjudications 
were born in after-work chatting over a cold beer; personal trust makes people select 
institutions sub-units that might not be specialized in that topic, but in which they feel 
their information will be secured and that effective joint work is possible (Interview 
23).  
The lack of institutional trust is, of course, not the only obstacle to 
coordination that we have identified. Inter-institutional relationships often face time 
and language obstacles. As procedures are normally sent to other institutions at their 
end and as their duration varies significantly, institutions might receive notice of anti-
corruption case years after the first institution got to know about it or after the case 
actually took place. This has impacts in evidence collection – that sometimes cannot 
be recollected – and in statute of limitations. For instance, if TCU takes a long time to 
send an adjudicatory decision to the Police or MP’s investigative unit so it can start 
the investigation – and sometimes that can take more than 2 years – any opportunity 
of pursuing proactive investigations, avoiding further damages and gathering more 
solid data is lost (Interviews 07 and 15).
 
Another example of a timing problem can 
occur in the relationship between TCU and CGU’s Internal Affairs: if CGU waits the 
TCU report on a given employee conduct, disciplinary procedures are often dismissed 
due to statute of limitations (Interview 19). Therefore, CGU usually have to act and 
take its decision regardless of the adjudication decision TCU – that, for instance, 
might have uncovered that case.   
Note that institutions often – but not always - can share information and 
evidence collected before the final report is actually finished, but only when there is 
express request, something that is unlikely to happen unless that case is already being 
investigated or adjudicated by the requester unit (Interview 19). Information exchange 
does not always take place with fluidity, as one interviewee puts, between civil and 
criminal investigative or adjudicatory procedures (Interview 19); as a possible 
solution, he affirms that more formal and permanent channels of communication and 
information exchange could be extremely useful. 
Inter-institutional coordination often faces languages obstacle: very often, one 
institution cannot fully comprehend or utilize reports made by others, due to language 
and analysis methods pursued. MP and Federal Police have shown difficulties in 
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understanding investigation reports from CGU, due to report technical language and 
management/efficiency focus – and not a legal one (Interview 01 and 14). That leads 
to the creation of “waste”, as big sections and analysis from investigative reports are 
totally disregarded by adjudication ones and sometimes procedures redoubled.
 
 
In order to tackle those problems, collective forums - like Rede de Controle do 
Gasto Público or ENCCLA – have incentivized the creation of basic procedural 
standards and common orientation to facilitate inter-institutional dialogue. Specialized 
anti-corruption units – like AGU’s Grupo de Atuação Pro-Ativa – create events and 
other opportunities to explain to other institutions what AGU needs from them in 
order to increase the chances that sanctions will be enforced and diverted public funds 
restituted when sanction enforcement starts.  
Coordination among civil, criminal and administrative proceedings is still a 
challenge – especially to what concern intra-institutional coordination in Ministério 
Público and Judiciary. Sub-units that deal with civil, criminal and administrative 
investigation not always communicate or coordinate with each other, elevating the 
procedural costs for them – since joint efforts could theoretically reduce financial and 
human capital needed to pursue those activities. This lack of coordination, especially 
present in the Ministério Público, has already been the basis of a recommendation by 
ENCCLA, as mentioned before. ENCCLA, however, can only recommend 
institutions to adopt those measures and cannot, under any circumstance, impose 
them. Until now, we were not able to gather information in the Ministério Público to 
confirm that initiatives in this path have already being taken. 
There is also an ongoing debate about whether proof and evidence produced in 
a civil or administrative investigation can be used as evidence in a criminal 
adjudication cases. Some judges still reject inter-procedural evidence exchange, as 
defense lawyers claim that the evidence collection proceedings in these different 
procedures (administrative, civil and criminal) varies and not always follow the more 
defendant-protective regulation present in criminal evidence production (that requires 
contraditório and ampla defesa of the defendant during evidence production). STJ 
already refused evidence produced by COAF and used by MPF to ask to break bank 
and communication secrecies of the investigated people in the taskforce operation 
Operation Boi Barrica/Faktor (Interview 13)
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. These rigid and restrictive Judiciary 
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dominant understanding for the non-utilization of the “lend evidence” (prova 
emprestada) seems to not foment cooperation between units and to disregard 
“procedural economy” (economia processual) principles stated in the Federal 
Constitution after Constitutional Amendment  45/04 (art. 5°, LXXVIII).  
Finally, we must recognize that although, during the last 10 years, Brazilian 
Public Administration has put a significant amount of information available online, 
there is still a long road in order to achieve better information exchange between 
governmental institutions or between governmental, civil society and citizens. 
Especially some period after the Lei de Acesso à Informação promulgation, the duty 
of public administration to provide citizens with performance information got clearer 
and more management and institutional information can be found online in websites 
like dados.gov.br; procedural information and statistics are still very scarce. As we 
have heard during in our interviews, the duty of producing information and releasing 
to the public actually contributed for inter-institutional sharing, as it pressured them to 
collect data that was not previously collected (as now citizens could require it and 
public administration punished if not able to comply with the request).
67
  
This performance and management information is usually stored in databases 
that have increasingly been shared among them. Database integration is also essential 
to help coordination between different procedures and institutions, as data from Police 
can be useful by MPF, data from TCU to CGU, etc. As one interviewee puts, “if we 
didn’t integrate the databases, they are not effective […] if there is not an strategy that 
thinks about it, police officers – like myself – cannot know that perhaps CGU already 
the information I need in another database that if merged to mine can bring 
significance improvements for my task” (Interview 11). In the last years, more and 
more partnerships were made between institutions for inter-institutional database 
sharing (Interview 07). A multi-institutional forum – TI Controle - was even created 
to function of the ENCCLA of database integration; its main idea is not to create new 
databases or store the information all at the same place; but providing easy access for 
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 In case the public administration does not provide the data in the given period, sanctions applied 
might include warnings, fines, dismissal, temporary suspension or even the prohibition to contract with 
government until rehabilitation is given by the same person that applied the sanctions. For more 
information, check article 33 from Law 12.527/11.  
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all of institutions to access and contribute to the existing databases, with the 
possibility to do cross data analysis.
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As we have learned in our research, coordination can be seen as a two-way 
road: if one wants others to cooperate and share information with him, he also needs 
to do the same for them. In order to continue to increase coordination, a mix between 
institutional and non-institutional mechanisms must be put in place: a system based 
on personal trust alone is not sustainable, as when employees and officials change or 
turn-over, coordination might cease. However, a system based only in institutional 
relationships might not have enough grease as it would seem required to make anti-
corruption coordination machinery run smoothly. Fostering coordination requires a 
willingness to cooperate and sometimes work hard and get little or no credit at all. As 
put by one interviewee, to coordinate “means you have to give up your immediate 
priority for collective priority; it means you have to invest work, intelligence and 
resources to reach a goal of everyone and not only a goal of your sub-unit.”
 
(Interview 
17). And not all institutions are willing to do so; in the short run, it is easier to just 
focus on its own work and disregard others. However, as this chapter shows, in a 
country like Brazil the costs of uncoordination in law enforcement are very high. 
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 TI Controle was created under the guidance of TCU and CGU, it started in 2006 with the goal to 
unify access to databases and standardize information inside the public administration; to create 
interoperability between their systems.  
